Can Europe defend itself?

What Trump has not done is explain exactly how far an American withdrawal might go or what Europeans can do to keep him interested in the old alliance. Which leaves those of us on this side of the Atlantic in the unenviable position of expecting the worst and hoping for the best. 

Most leaders and officials agree, through gritted teeth, that Trump has a point when he criticises Europe’s frugality and accept that they have been asleep on the job, especially in responding to Russia’s resurgence over the past decade. 

Ultimately, Trump might not withdraw troops from Europe or leave NATO. But the days that Europe could sleep tight, safe in the knowledge it could depend on America to protect it, are gone. It’s possible that Trump is not an aberration, but an extreme embodiment of the present and future of American foreign policy – a foreign policy that no longer cares very much about Europe. 

What the continent should do about all of this is to some extent obvious: spend, coordinate, cooperate, and try to keep America interested. But appetites for how far they should go vary wildly. 

In the coming months, we will likely hear proposals ranging from pooled spending and coordination on policy to a fully-fledged European army. But, really, what does success look like for Europe, if it’s to truly end its reliance on America for security and become a serious geopolitical player?

A European non-starter

It’s worth laying out early on that anything resembling a pan-European army is extremely unlikely. 

“I sigh when I hear people talk about European armies,” says Hakon Lunde Saxi from the Norwegian Defence University College. “It’s actually really unhelpful spending political capital on something that is dead in the water. As bad as things are now, Russia is not the Soviet Union of the 1950s – that was the last time a ‘European army’ had any credible support.” 

There are many reasons a pan-European army is probably a non-starter. Difficult questions about who would provide what level of funding, troops and command the whole thing would be extremely hard to navigate. Would British taxpayers be happy funding the defence of Liechtenstein? Who would participate? What role would the EU play, given it contains a number of neutral member states? And why would countries who have historically not met their NATO targets suddenly feel compelled to go along with a new structure?

Even if those questions were answered, their solutions would almost certainly create overlap with NATO (which still exists, by the way), further complicating coordination on the continent – not to mention Europe’s relationship with America. 

Those who have spent years awaiting this moment mostly agree that the easiest way to organise a continent-wide security boost is to “Europeanise” NATO, rather than walk away and try to start something new. 

There is some logic to this strategy. A sudden influx of European cash into the alliance means some of it might be spent in America. Not only would Europe be legitimately bolstering its own defence, it would also demonstrate the transactional benefits of a military alliance to Trump in the language he best understands: cold hard cash. 

A Europe less reliant on America that is also chucking cash at US firms suddenly looks more attractive to the US taxpayer and might convince the leader of the free world to cool his jets. 

You’d be forgiven at this point for wondering why, exactly, scrambling to appease a US President who openly holds Europe in contempt is so essential. 

The thing is, as attractive as a world where Europe has zero reliance on America might sound, it’s just not practically possible – for at least a decade, but probably longer. Rearming, recruiting and training personnel, reshaping armed forces and giving industry the time to build what is required cannot happen overnight. 

In other words, Europe faces a real threat today, but an alternative to American support won’t exist for a long time. 

“US withdrawal would leave holes in NATO capabilities – not so much in terms of foot soldiers as in high end capabilities like air-to-air refuelling,” says Adam Thompson, the former British ambassador to NATO. 

“It would take years to fill those gaps and to do so efficiently would require consolidation of the European defence industry (or simply buying American) sustaining higher defence spending, and rationalising and pooling procurement,” says Thompson. 

Arguably harder than replacing US equipment and troops would be replicating America’s intelligence and surveillance capabilities. 

So, the consensus is that Europe’s best short-term bet is to keep Trump inside NATO and interested in Europe by strengthening the alliance in a way that visibly benefits America – financially and strategically. If Trump were to pull US troops from the continent, it’s possible he could be persuaded to continue sharing intelligence with Europeans in exchange for something else. 

However, Europeans should also be thinking about the long-term. Even if Trump is convinced to stay in the alliance, America’s dwindling interest in Europe predates Trump and is likely to continue, whoever takes over the White House in four years. 

What should European defence look like?

All evidence suggests that Europe is about to throw a lot more money at defence than it has in decades. If European governments are serious about a collective, collaborative defence policy, they should start with carefully coordinated spending. 

Defence procurement is always extremely challenging for national governments. Limited budgets are seldom enough for the massive shopping lists that armies and defence ministers might have. That means governments have to make hard-nosed decisions and prioritise what they need the most. 

This might mean a fleet of drones gets priority over a new aircraft carrier or countries invest in recruiting people with specific skills in areas like cyber security, but allow ammunition stocks to run low. To be clear, that is not a value judgment: all of these things are valid and important. All could hypothetically be priorities over the others, it really depends on the biggest threat your country faces. 

Something NATO officials often complain about is duplication across the alliance. It is not necessarily as important for a country sitting in the West of Europe to have as many tanks at its disposal as a country that shares a border with Russia, for example. Duplication can also be financially unwise, as inflated demand for particular equipment creates an artificial market high. There is only so much kit up for sale, so if everyone in Europe suddenly wants it, the market will do its thing. 

Coordinating procurement is one thing; coordinating strategically is quite another – though it presents plenty of opportunities for Europe to get creative. 

A continent as geographically diverse as Europe – spanning the Arctic to the Mediterranean, bordering Russia and the Middle East through Turkey – faces many different challenges, depending on where you sit. Those challenges have existed for a long time, however, meaning that individual countries have developed specific skills in national security. 

Between countries like Greece and Italy patrolling the Mediterranean sea in the south, Finland and Sweden monitoring undersea cables in the north, the Baltics staring down Russian borders in the east and Turkey’s influential role in the Middle East, Europe combined could make a formidable military power. 

Add to that two independent nuclear states in Britain and France, then fold in Germany’s economic heft, and you begin to see a clear pitch for how an emboldened Europe might look. 

Where things get tricky is the politics of coordination. As alluded to earlier, there is unlikely to be a commanding role for the EU in any of this. The EU is of course able to generate huge amounts of money for investment. It can issue bonds, borrow and raise funds in a way that no country would be able to individually. It can even help coordinate procurement though schemes like the European Industrial Defence Strategy. 

But the idea of the EU sending troops into battle has historically had huge opposition from the member states, something unlikely to change even in these challenging times. 

What would success look like?

First off, Europe would need to sort out two key issues: spending commitments and agreeing to a command structure. 

“The money is the crux, and even though a lot of movement happened here, we’re still not talking about it seriously enough,” says Sophia Besch, senior fellow at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 

“3% was the target with the US. But that’s already a struggle for big economies. The solution will have to be a mix of taxes, social cuts, borrowing and joint funding. The EU can help, but it’s no silver bullet for national spending increases,” she adds. 

European security officials are privately briefing that allies will be pressured to formally commit to 3% of GDP at the NATO summit in June, replacing the previous 2% target. Eastern European officials take the view that 3% – or even higher – is necessary because years of not meeting the 2% target means historic shortfalls need to be addressed as well as new capability. 

Agreeing a command structure could be even harder, though not impossible. 

As Besch says, “it can’t be NATO in its current form, of course, but it would be a waste to give up on established structures in the institution, which just don’t exist in the EU. NATO in a new form as Merz said. Decision making could happen in the ‘coalitions of the influential’ format we saw in Paris, with the most important Europeans plus NATO plus EU.”

If those questions are answered, then Europe can start thinking about a long-term plan. Success is a strange concept to define here, as the rupture with America that precipitated this crisis damages all parties. But success for Europe over 10 to 15 years probably means credible alternatives to what the US provided in terms of intelligence and surveillance on top of all the more obvious things like troops, equipment and gear. 

Officials can see a world where geographical regions stitch together, with bigger and more powerful countries working hand-in-hand with their immediate neighbours. In the east, that might mean Poland’s formidable forces working more closely with the Baltic states. In the north it could mean the British Navy working closely with the Nordic states, protecting the north and Arctic sea. 

The most important coordination, however, would need to address crisis response across the continent. For example, if a Baltic state believed it was at risk of invasion from Russia, it would need air defences. This could take the form of Britain providing surface-to-air missile systems and possibly people to operate them. It could also mean Finland providing intelligence and tactical support. 

In recent years, NATO has done something similar to this, setting out specific roles for allies in the case of an attack. Alongside these objectives are so-called Capability Targets, giving specific recommendations to allies on what they might need in terms of troops, weapons and other essentials. 

What about the US?

A long-term success, however you want to define it, is still a very long way off and relies on some pretty important short-term certainty. Chiefly, it relies on America still providing some level of support to Europe as it builds its own capability. 

As we’ve already established, there is no chop and change alternative to American power in Europe. Sure, there are certain things that could be done to mitigate the damage, but they won’t magically make troops, weapons and capability appear overnight. 

What would make the Americans – under Trump or whoever follows him – stay inside NATO and interested in Europe?

The first step for Europeans is to stop pretending that NATO is over. The defeatist claim some are making that the alliance is done because America has broken Article 5 in spirit is dubious at best. 

While plenty of commentators have expressed big opinions on NATO and Article 5 of late, few seem to have ever read the text, which runs at a palatable 145 words. 

“The Trump administration’s position that Europe needs to take the lead on European defence might spook our allies, but it is not at odds with Article 5, nor does it suggest America would not fulfil its Article 5 obligations as they are outlined in the treaty,” says John Herbst, a former US Ambassador to Ukraine.

Herbst says the best way to appeal to America is to not only increase spending, but spend in the right areas – thus actually reducing the US burden in Europe, rather than chuck money around aimlessly.

“A very high percentage of European spending goes on personnel. But Europe needs to increase its defence industry and production. There needs to be some way to establish European-wide procurement,” he says. 

This is where sending European money to America becomes possible. If European allies pool together cash and spend it on buying gear from US firms, that creates jobs in America and gives US politicians positive stories to tell their voters about Europe. It also might counter Trump’s assertion that Europe exists only to rip off America. 

“The Trumpian view seems to be that defence spending in Europe should mean bulk orders from the US. That is the context in which he encourages increases to 5% of GDP,” says Nick Witney, senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. 

“It is therefore possible to reframe that narrative to mean that America defending Europe ultimately means massive contracts for US firms,” he adds. 

Can this work?

The demise of the West has been predicted many times over. The US-led world order has been declared dead, only to miraculously recover. 

Europe is still part of both the US-led order and the West. It still has agency and the ability to shape its own destiny. It still has lots of money and influence over the US president. At times of crisis, there will always be a handful of people who believe that the world has changed in an instant. But that very rarely happens. 

The challenge for Europeans over the coming years is not to resist change, but to embrace it and dictate its pace. Security and the ability to protect itself from its adversaries is crucial. That means, no matter how distasteful they might find Trump, keeping in mind that the country he leads is still our most important ally – and taking whatever valid criticisms he has of Europe seriously. 

In short: spend more, spend wisely, and don’t piss off our bigger brother while he still has the strength to bully us.