Inside Norway’s Brexits

Norway had first applied to join what was then the European Economic Community (EEC) twice in the 1960s, along with Denmark, Ireland and the UK. However, when French president Charles de Gaulle vetoed the UK’s applications, negotiations with all the countries were effectively ended due to their strong economic ties as members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).

When de Gaulle’s successor, George Pompidou, agreed not to stand in the way of the UK joining, the three countries reapplied, paving the way for the first enlargement of the EEC. Between June 1971 and January 1972, Norway’s Labour government negotiated the conditions for its own entry. 

However, when the deal was put to the country in September, it was surprisingly rejected by a small majority of 53.5%, leading to the collapse of Trygve Bratteli’s administration.

“The 1972 referendum was a very tortuous process. It was highly politicised, it was highly antagonistic,” says Professor John Erik Fossum, a professor at Oslo University. “Families were divided, regions opposed each other. It was one of the most traumatic events in the Norwegian post-war period.”

Still-fresh memories of Nazi occupation during world war two caused considerable suspicion towards the idea of joining an organisation dominated by Germany, and in a largely Protestant country, so too did the idea that the EEC was a Catholic conspiracy. “Religion and occupation were potent factors, even if not that loudly expressed,” says Fossum.

Following the ‘72 referendum, membership quickly faded from political discussion, essentially becoming a non-issue. There was no vocal campaign for the result to be reversed. Yet, little more than two decades later, in 1994, Norwegians found themselves back at the ballot box considering the same question.

As with their original applications, this was in part a consequence of decisions elsewhere. Denmark and Great Britain had left EFTA to join the EEC in 1973, Portugal following suit in 1986. In the early 1990s, Finland and Sweden began to see their future in the post-Maastricht EU, so they applied for membership. If they were both successful, then, in contrast to 1972, there would be no credible Nordic economic block outside the EU.

Although not as divisive as the first referendum, “the battle of the EU”, as the campaign became known, was nonetheless heated. The Labour Party’s Gro Harlem Brundtland, Norway’s first female prime minister was pitted against Anne Enger Lahnstein, the leader of the Center Party, who became known as the “No Queen”.

The ‘No’ campaign ‘Nei til EU’ organised quickly and effectively, reaching a peak of around 139,000 members. As it would be in Britain 22 years later, sovereignty was central to their argument. 

Norway had only become a fully independent country in 1905, prior to which it had been ruled by first Denmark and then Sweden. Lahnstein evoked these historically subservient relationships arguing that EU membership would be worse, leading to cuts in both the public sector and Norway’s generous benefits system. She also spuriously argued that a ‘Yes’ vote would see the EU take control of Norway’s natural resources, and by extension its growing oil fortune.

“The idea of fake news is not new,” says Fossum, “but there was fake news on both sides. The ‘No’ side was overplaying the supranational character of the EU while the ‘Yes’ side was underplaying it.”

Slower to mobilise, the ‘Yes’ campaign Europabevegelsen i Norge (the European Movement in Norway) never reached more than 35,000 members. Also, in downplaying the effects of EU membership, they never effectively challenged the ‘No’ side’s characterisation of the EU allowing their opponents to effectively become the champions of the nation and the welfare state.

The ‘Yes’ campaign’s key argument was economic: joining would lead to greater integration and growth, continued non-membership in an era of expansion and change would lead to isolation.

However, this argument was significantly undermined by the fact that in 1993, Norway had signed the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement. It was deemed a “medium-speed alternative” for the EFTA countries, and it gave Norway full access to the EU’s internal market in every sector other than farming and fishing.

Thus, although the referendum offered voters a seemingly simple “yes–no” choice, the decision was more nuanced. A ‘no’ vote would not repeal the agreement; unlike in the Brexit referendum, it would not disrupt the status quo.

“There was a centrist position,” says Fossum. “In that context, it was easy to say ‘no’ because the transition would be smaller than it would otherwise have been and even some people who were hesitant on the ‘yes’ side, could settle for the EEA Agreement and say ‘well, we have the economic certainty, we don’t need membership’.”

In a strategic move known as svenskesuget, or ‘Swedish suction’, Brundtland scheduled the 1994 vote to come after similar votes by their Scandinavian neighbours in a deliberate attempt to sway people by riding on the yes votes of the other countries. Finland, the most EU-friendly, went to the polls first in mid-October, Sweden went second on November 13, with Norway last, on November 28.

The other countries both voted in favour of joining, albeit narrowly in Sweden’s case. Norway again said ‘Nei’. On a turnout of 89%, the result was notably similar to Brexit: 52.5% rejected membership, 47.5% voting in favour. 

“It was a close call,” says Fossum, “slightly closer than in 1972. I think Brundtland probably thought she would carry it, but I don’t think it was a big surprise because of the strong mobilisation on the ‘No’ side.”

There were other similarities to 2016. The country’s capital, Oslo, where political power is concentrated, unambiguously voted ‘yes’, as did the five nearby counties situated along the Oslo fjord. The remaining 14 countries all rejected the EU, with the north of the country seeing the strongest ‘no’ vote. “It’s about political distance,” says Fossum. “’It’s far to Oslo, but it’s even further to Brussels’ is basically what they were saying.”

Some 94% of farmers and most of the fishing industry voted ‘no’. Unlike Brexit, however, more women than men voted ‘no’ as did around 53% of public sector workers, motivated by a desire to protect Norway’s strong welfare state.

“It was the people who made the decision, and we as a country have to live with that,” said Brundtland in the aftermath of the vote. She ruled out resignation, staying as prime minister for another four years, before becoming director general of the World Health Organisation.

Lahnstein hailed the result, saying, “With this, we have said ‘yes’ to Europe and ‘yes’ to international solidarity, but we don’t want to join the Union.” At face value, her comments seemed counter-intuitive, but they spoke to the already intricate nature of Norway’s relationship to Europe and gave a hint at how it would develop over the coming years.

Despite rejecting membership twice, the country has as close a relationship a non-member can have with the EU. Norway has adopted around 75% of all EU laws and regulations through more than 130 agreements and treaties covering issues ranging from asylum and police cooperation to defence cooperation.

Norway joined the Schengen area, so that it could keep its 1,010-mile border with Sweden open and maintain the Nordic Passport Union. Thus, it is inside the EU’s external border, with responsibility for border controls.

Due to its membership of the single market, Norway makes substantial contributions to the EU budget, and it has adopted the so-called ‘four freedoms’: the free movement of goods, services, capital and people. Any EU citizen is free to live and work in Norway and Norwegians can live and work across the EU.

In effect, therefore, Norway has maintained formal sovereignty, while delegating actual sovereignty in many areas. It’s hard to think that any Brexiteer would have thought that this is what Brexit meant.

Opinion polls show that little has changed since the second referendum in 1994. The Norwegian Citizen Panel, an online focus group, found that in 2019 only 26% of the population was in favour of the joining, while 60% was opposed. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, there was a slight shift, but still only 35 per cent were in favour. Fifty-one per cent were adamantly opposed.

Yet, this is not to say the compromise Norway has reached is easy. “It’s still very, very controversial,” says Fossum. How does the country deal with this controversy? “By not talking about it. It has been subdued a lot. Keeping it under wraps makes it easier to accept.”

But, Fossum warns, this does not mean the issue is settled. “Norwegians’ inability to deal with this is something the British should keep in mind,” he says. “It’s not a wise thing to simply put this aside, because it will come up again.”