Trump is no isolationist

The return of president Trump has ushered in a period of revolutionary change in America’s domestic and international policies. The new administration is likely to prove highly disruptive to transatlantic relations on multiple fronts. What can Europe expect? How should Europe respond?

First, the first experience of the Trump administration is likely to offer only a limited guide to what we can expect this time around. Mercurial, personality driven politics will remain at the fore.

But the president is now surrounded by a cadre of ideologically-driven appointees with pronounced policy agendas. This is also likely to be a more experienced and professional administration, more capable of reshaping policies through executive orders. In this, the administration will benefit from (narrow) majorities in the House and the Senate, and a favourable balance in the Supreme Court. The cascade of executive orders on climate and energy, spending, “DEI” and trade needs to be taken at face value.

Second, the new administration may be many things, but it is not isolationist. This is likely to be an activist administration defined by nationalism (Americans prefer to say “patriotism”) unilateralism and the primacy of geopolitics over values. Democracy promotion is out, transactional diplomacy is in. Asia is at the top of the agenda. Indeed, a tougher posture toward China is one of the very few issues on which Republicans and Democrats are on the same page.

This will have consequences for Europe in both economic and security terms. The approach to the European Union itself is likely to differ sharply from that of the Biden administration. Despite some areas of real disagreement, Biden and his team were inclined to see the EU as a key interlocutor on many issues, something that was not always true of the Obama administration.

President Trump will be much more inclined to see transatlantic relations through the lens of individual leaders, for better or for worse. This is a structural shift. The US is unlikely to withdraw from Nato, but Alliance politics are surely heading for more difficult weather, with even more pointed debates over defence burden-sharing.

Third, the new Trump administration is prepared to make explicit linkages between economic and security policies. Vice president Vance has gone so far as to suggest that Washington’s commitment to European security will be influenced by the treatment of American companies in Brussels. On many fronts, economic warfare will be the order of the day.

How should Europe respond? By virtue of ideological affinity or geopolitical necessity, some EU members will be proactive in engaging the new administration. Others may adopt a strategy of “wait and see” on everything from tariffs to defence spending. But hopeful passivity is unlikely to pay dividends against a backdrop of personality-driven diplomacy and aggressive mercantilism. European leaders will do better to engage the new administration on its own terms, with an eye to the nexus of commercial and geopolitical interest.

Dr Ian Lesser is Distinguished Fellow and Advisor to the President, The German Marshall Fund of the United States